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Abstract
A core objective of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project was to ensure that profits are
taxed where activities generating the profits take place. In this regard, international policy making
organisations, such as the OECD and EU Commission, have reinforced the application of certain
activity-based concepts, such as substantial activities, core commercial activity, controls over risks,
economic reality and substantial economic activities, in soft and hard law instruments. If these concepts
were to be consolidated it could be argued that, if the taxpayer were to comply with the relevant economic
activities test, as developed in this article, then that taxpayer entity should be: 1. allocated the returns
(income) from a transfer pricing perspective; 2. given access to tax treaty benefits in relation to the income
it derives; 3. given access to benefits offered by EU law, in particular, the non-application of selected
national anti-abuse rules (such as Controlled Foreign Company Rules) and anti-avoidance rules found
in the corporate tax directives such as the Parent Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalty
Directive as well as the European Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (for instance, the General Anti-Abuse
Rule); and 4. the taxpayer entity should obtain access to economic activity-based preferential regimes.
This article supports this proposition by taking into consideration the latest versions of the OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines, the OECD Commentary, the case law of several courts, in particular the Court of
Justice of the European Union, state practices as well as scholarly literature. Essentially, multinational
enterprises (MNEs) can continue to engage in profit shifting activities post-BEPS. Furthermore, tax
competition intensifies between states to attract economic activities, either through tax incentives or
corporate tax rate/withholding tax rate reductions. Moreover, given that the activity-based concepts are
subjective, both tax uncertainty and tax disputes will be on the rise. Interestingly, the activity-based
concepts do not alter the allocation of the taxing rights framework agreed by states. Nevertheless, in light
of the digital debate, there is pressure to reconsider the allocation of the taxing rights framework (Pillar
I) and to find solutions to counter genuine profit shifting strategies to low tax jurisdictions/tax competition
among states (Pillar II). Thus, the movement from BEPS 1.0 to BEPS 2.0 (Base Expansion and Profit
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Sharing) is already being witnessed. The challenges raised by digitalisation will be discussed in a later
article.
1. Introduction and scope of the article
1.1. The post-BEPS international corporate tax framework
A core objective of the BEPS Project was “to ensure that profits are taxed where economic
activities generating the profits take place and value is created”.1 In this regard, international
policy making organisations, such as the OECD and EU Commission, have reinforced the
application of certain activity-based concepts in the international corporate tax framework.
At the domestic tax policy level, BEPS Action 5,2 which is a minimum standard, introduced
the substantial activities test. The test provides that states can introduce/offer preferential tax
incentives only when the taxpayer entity undertakes core income generating economic activities.
In relation to tax treaty policy, BEPS Action 6,3 which is a minimum standard, obligated
states to modify the preamble of their tax treaties to reflect that the purpose of tax treaties, in
addition to the elimination of double taxation, is to prevent the creation of opportunities for tax
evasion or tax avoidance (especially, treaty-shopping arrangements).4 Additionally, states were
required to include in their tax treaties either: 1. the Principal Purpose Test (PPT)5; 2. the PPT
and the limitation on benefits (LOB) clause6 (the latter being drafted in a simplified version7);
3. a detailed LOB clause and anti-abuse measures to counteract conduit arrangements.8 The
anti-abuse measures could stem from domestic law (such as the US conduit financing rules9) or
could be treaty based (such as the anti-conduit rule contained in Article 3(1)(n) of the 2001
US–UK tax treaty10). In order to meet this minimum standard, 87 jurisdictions have signed the
Multilateral Instrument11 (as at 9 April 2019) and will adopt the revised preamble12 and, for the
1OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, BEPS Project Explanatory Statement—2015 Final Reports
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), 4.
2OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking
into Account Transparency and Substance, Action 5—2015 Final Report (Action 5) (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015),
available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241190-en [Accessed 18 June 2019].
3OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate
Circumstances, Action 6—2015 Final Report (Action 6) (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015).
4Action 6, above fn.3, paras 72–74.
5Action 6, above fn.3, para.26; OECD,Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2017 (Full Version) (Paris:
OECD Publishing, 2019) (OECD MC 2017), available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g972ee-en [Accessed 13 June
2019] Art.29(9).
6OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Art.29(1)–(7).
7Action 6, above fn.3, para.25 (Commentary in para.2); OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29,
para.2.
8Action 6, above fn.3, para.25 (Commentary in para.3); OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29,
para.3.
9See US IRC s.881 read in conjunction with US Treasury regulations, 1.881-3.
10 See Art.3(1)(n), UK–US Double Taxation Convention (2001) as amended by the 2002 protocol. The provision
provides for an objective and motive test.
11 OECD, Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting (Multilateral Convention 2016) (24 November 2016).
12See Multilateral Convention 2016, above fn.11, Art.6(1); OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Title and Preamble.
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most part, the PPT rule.13 To the extent that the PPT will form part of a tax treaty, arrangements
that are linked to core commercial activity14 will be allowed to claim treaty benefits. In other
words, transactions through shell companies or back-to-back arrangements that lack a commercial
rationale will not be granted treaty benefits. As the PPT has already been discussed extensively,
the authors will focus on its subjective and objective elements and will not undertake a critical
analysis of all its elements.15 Moreover, as only a few states16 have opted for the LOB clause (in
particular, the simplified LOB clause), this provision will also not be discussed hereinafter.
With respect to the policy surrounding the arm’s length principle, BEPS Actions 8–1017 were
dedicated to ensuring that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation. In this regard,
the revised Transfer Pricing Guidelines,18 in addition to several other changes, provide that an
entity will be allocated risks (and the underlying income associated therewith) only to the extent
that the entity through its personnel controls the risks and has the financial means, that is, the
financial capacity, to assume those risks.19
Last, with respect to EU Tax Policy, the EU Commission released an anti-tax avoidance
package.20 Among several initiatives, the package consisted of an Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive
(ATAD).21 The main purpose of the ATAD,22 which was adopted in July 2016, is to ensure
efficient, coherent, co-ordinated and swift incorporation of BEPS measures within the EU.23
Towards this end, the ATAD lays out a minimum framework (set of rules) that Member States
have to transpose in to their domestic law. Essentially, Member States are required to implement
a statutory General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR)24 and controlled foreign company (CFC) rules25
13See Multilateral Convention 2016, above fn.11, Art.7(1); OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Art.29(9).
14OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.181.
15B. Kuźniacki, “The Principal Purpose Test (PPT) in BEPS Action 6 and the MLI: Exploring Challenges Arising
from Its Legal Implementation and Practical Application” (2018) 10 World Tax Journal 233; R. Danon, “Treaty
Abuse in the Post-BEPS World: Analysis of the Policy Shift and Impact of the Principal Purpose Test for MNE
Groups” (2018) 72(1) Bulletin for International Taxation 31; R. Danon and H. Salomé, “The BEPS Multilateral
Instrument — General overview and focus on treaty abuse” [2017] IFF Forum für Steurrecht 197, 223–235; L. De
Broe and J. Luts, “BEPS Action 6: Tax Treaty Abuse” (2015) 43(2) Intertax 122; L. De Broe, “Tax Treaty and the
EU Law aspects of the LOB and PPT provision proposed by BEPS Action 6” in R. Danon (ed.), Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (BEPS) – Impact for European and international tax policy (Geneva, Zurich and Basel: Schulthess,
2016); M. Lang, “BEPSAction 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties” (2014) 74(7) Tax Notes International
655.
16Namely Argentina, India, Norway and Russia.
17 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation,
Actions 8–10: 2015 Final Reports (Paris: OECD Publishing, 5 October 2015). The OECD Council approved these
amendments on 23 May 2016.
18OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2017 (OECD,
TP Guidelines 2017) (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017).
19OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, paras 1.64–1.66.
20For further information, see EUCommission, Anti Tax Avoidance Package, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation
_customs/business/company-tax/anti-tax-avoidance-package_en [Accessed 26 June 2019].
21 For a general discussion on the ATAD see P. Pistone (ed.), European Tax Integration: Law, Policy and Politics
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2018).
22Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164/EU of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly
affect the functioning of the internal market [2016] OJ L193/1.
23Directive 2016/1164/EU, above fn.22, 2.
24Directive 2016/1164/EU, above fn.22, Art.6.
25Directive 2016/1164/EU, above fn.22, Arts 7–8.
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among other measures.26 However, according to the ATAD, these anti-abuse rules may not apply
if the arrangements undertaken by taxpayers are for valid commercial reasons which reflect
economic reality or reflect substantial economic activities respectively.27
1.2. The relevant economic activity test
If one consolidates the concepts of substantial activities, core commercial activity, controls over
risks, economic reality and substantial economic activities, it could be argued that if the taxpayer
demonstrates not only the commercial rationale of the arrangement (non-fiscal purposes) but
also its economic rationale, then that taxpayer should be given access to the benefits offered by
the international corporate tax framework. To elaborate, from an economic standpoint, the
taxpayer can demonstrate that it carries out the relevant economic activities (or core income
generating activities) with respect to the underlying income that it receives. This would typically
be the case when a taxpayer entity in a corporate group demonstrates that: 1. its personnel (board
and/or operating staff to the extent relevant) make key decisions with respect to the risks associated
with that entity’s activities; 2. the core income generating functions of the entity are carried out
by the entity’s personnel; 3. the entity owns/leases the necessary office space and/or equipment
to carry out its activities. In these circumstances, the taxpayer entity should be:
• allocated substantial returns (income) from a transfer pricing perspective;
• given access to tax treaty benefits for the income it derives;
• given access to benefits granted by EU law that is, selected anti-abuse rules found
in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (PSD)28 and the Interest and Royalties Directive
(IRD)29 should not apply. Moreover, the EU ATAD GAAR and CFC Rules (within
the EU) should not apply to this entity; and
• given access to substance based preferential regimes.
The next part of this article will substantiate the foregoing argument. The authors will also
make certain recommendations in the form of minimum functional profile safeguards to
multinational enterprises that make use of holding, financing, intellectual property (IP) and
principal structures (see section 2). The issues that arise with respect to the relevant economic
activities test will be discussed thereafter, specifically, issues pertaining to tax competition and
tax uncertainty (see section 3). Finally, the authors conclude their analysis and discuss the way
forward (see section 4).
26The other measures relate to an interest limitation rule (Directive 2016/1164/EU, above fn.22, Art.4); an immediate
exit tax rule (Directive 2016/1164/EU, above fn.22, Art.5); and anti-hybrid rules (Directive 2016/1164/EU, above
fn.22, Art.9). As highlighted in s.1.3, a discussion on these measures is beyond the scope of this article.
27 The exclusion for CFC rules only applies to intra-EU situations. Therefore, Member States could implement the
CFC rule without a carve-out for genuine activities of subsidiaries or permanent establishments outside the EU. For
a criticism of this form of “fiscal protectionism”, see R. Danon, “Some Observations on the Carve-Out Clause of
Article 7(2)(a) of the ATAD with Regard to Third Countries” in P. Pistone and D. Weber (eds), The Implementation
of Anti-BEPS Rules in the EU: A Comprehensive Study (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2018), 387–407.
28Council Directive (EU) 2015/121 of 27 January 2015 amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common system of
taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States [2015] OJ L21/1.
29Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty
payments made between associated companies of different Member States [2003] OJ L157/49.
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1.3. Further matters not discussed in this article
As this article focuses on economic activities carried out in a taxpayer entity, the authors will
not include a discussion of rules relating to hybrid entities and instruments,30 rules limiting interest
deductions,31 rules to counter artificial avoidance of the permanent establishment status32 and the
international corporate tax policy debate triggered by the digitalisation of the economy.33 Neither
will the authors include a discussion of the concept of beneficial ownership as found in Articles
10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model34 and the EU IRD.35 Moreover, with respect to EU law, the
authors will not engage in a debate on EU state aid rules.
2. The arguable impact of the relevant economic activities test on the international corporate
tax framework
2.1. Risk and income allocation from a transfer pricing perspective
Article 9 of the OECD Model provides for the application of the arm’s length principle for
transactions among associated enterprises. Specifically, Article 9(1) discusses those situations
in which the tax administrationmay invoke a primary adjustment. It is clear that price adjustments
are permitted. Disputably, structural adjustments are also allowed.36 This being said, such
30OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements,
Action 2—2015 Final Report (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015).
31 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and
Other Financial Payments, Action 4—2016 Update: Inclusive Framework on BEPS (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017).
32OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project,Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment
Status, Action 7—2015 Final Report (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015).
33OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action
1—2015 Final Report (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015); OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation—Interim
Report 2018 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018).
34For an analysis of the concept see A. Meindl-Ringler, Beneficial Ownership in International Tax Law (Alphen aan
den Rijn: Kluwer, 2016).
35See I. Lazarov, “(Un)Tangling Tax Avoidance Under the Interest and Royalties Directive: the Opinion of AGKokott
in N Luxembourg 1” (2018) 46(11) Intertax 873.
36 Transactions undertaken by the taxpayer should be respected. However, at the outset, the question arises as to
whether OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Art.9(1) allows a state to re-characterise the transaction as structured by the
taxpayer (entire arrangement or a part of the arrangement) if it is not at arm’s length. The OECD believes that this is
indeed possible in “exceptional” cases. See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines (1979), para.23 and OECD, Transfer
Pricing Guidelines (2010), para.1.64. According to the 2010 Guidelines, transactions can be re-characterised when:
1. their form does not correspond to the underlying economic substance; or 2. when they are commercially irrational,
and the structure of the transaction practically impedes the tax administration from determining an appropriate transfer
price. See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines (2010), para.1.65. However, the 2017 Guidelines seem to havemodified
the OECD’s position on these two exceptions. First, the economic substance exception has been deleted. Arguably,
this seems justified given that the focus of the revised guidance on accurately delineating the transaction seems to be
on factual substance, that is, identifying the legal substance of the commercial or financial relations between the
parties and understanding the controlled transaction by analysing all the economically relevant characteristics. See
OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, paras 1.119–1.120. Also see, R. Collier and J.L. Andrus, Transfer Pricing
and the Arm’s Length Principle (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 199. Secondly, the scope of the commercially irrational
exception has been redrafted. Essentially, the tax administration will have to prove that, in addition to the transaction
being commercially irrational, the structure of the transaction prevents the determination of the price that would be
acceptable to both parties given their respective realistically available options. The guidance on non-recognition will
not apply when a comparable transaction exists. See OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, paras 1.121–1.123;
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adjustments can only bemade to the extent authorised by the domestic transfer pricing legislation.37
On the other hand, if a state makes a price or structural adjustment under Article 9(1), the other
state, to the extent that it agrees with the primary adjustment, will be required to provide, in
accordance with Article 9(2), a corresponding adjustment.
The application of the arm’s length principle is a two-step process. The first step involves an
accurate delineation of the transaction whereas the second step involves reaching an arm’s length
outcome for the transaction. With respect to the first step, in order to accurately delineate a
transaction or find the real deal, the post-BEPS transfer pricing guidance establishes a strong
link between income (return) allocation and risk assumption.38 In this regard, a detailed framework
for analysing the relevant or economically significant risks is provided.39 Essentially, the
framework provides that the risks and returns should be allocated to the entity that “controls”40
the risk and has the financial means41 to bear the risk even if the intra group contracts allocate
the risk to another party.42
Arguably the “control” test43 is met when the entity employs relevant personnel44 (directors
and/or employees) and the functions of this personnel demonstrate that they not only have the
capability to perform and make decisions but they also make decisions with respect to: 1. taking
on, laying off or declining the key risks associated with the relevant economic activities; and 2.
deciding whether and how to respond to the risks associated with their decision-making
opportunity. Even if the day-to-day functions/economic activities associated with the risks are
outsourced, the outcome should also be similar as long as the personnel in the entity (claiming
control over risk) are able to demonstrate that they can oversee and manage the outsourced risks.45
Moreover, it could be argued that the entity would have the financial means46 when the entity
has the appropriate access to the funding to take on or to lay off the risk, to pay for the risk
also see Collier and Andrus, above, 201–202. In the authors’ opinion, the wording of Art.9 does permit structural
adjustments.
37OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Art.9(1) does not create “new” taxing rights. The provision, similar to other treaty
provisions, restricts the application of domestic law provisions. Therefore, structural adjustments can be made only
to the extent authorised by the domestic law. V. Chand, “Transfer Pricing Aspects of Inter company Loans in light
of the BEPS Action Plan” (2016) 44(12) Intertax 885, 885-–889.
38OECD, TPGuidelines 2017, above fn.18, paras 1.56–1.59; UN, Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing
Countries (UN, TP Manual (2017)) (2017), paras B.2.3.2.23-B.2.3.2.24.
39OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, para.1.60; UN, TPManual (2017), above fn.38, para.B.2.3.2.25. It should
be noted that the pre-BEPS chapter on business restructurings only indicated these requirements as potential indicators
to allocate risks. See Collier and Andrus, above fn.36, 203.
40OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, para.1.65; UN, TP Manual (2017), above fn.38, para.B.2.3.2.35.
41OECD, TPGuidelines 2017, above fn.18, para.1.64; UN, TPManual (2017), above fn.38, paras B.2.3.2.38–B.2.3.2.40.
42 I. Verlinden, D. Ledure and M. Dessy, “The Risky Side of Transfer Pricing: The OECD Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting Reports Sharpen the Rules on Risk Allocation under the Arm’s Length Standard” (2016) 23 International
Transfer Pricing Journal 109, 110-–112.
43Also see W. Schön, “International Taxation of Risk” (2014) 68 Bulletin for International Taxation 280, 288–290;
J. Monsenego, “The Substance Requirement in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines: What Is the Substance of the
Substance Requirement?” (2014) 21 International Transfer Pricing Journal 9, 14–15.
44 Such decision makers need to have the right competence and experience to make the decisions. See OECD, TP
Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, para.1.66; UN, TPManual (2017), above fn.38, para.B.2.3.2.36. For a detailed discussion
on this matter, see Monsenego, above fn.43, 12–13.
45OECD, TPGuidelines 2017, above fn.18, para.1.65; UN, TPManual (2017), above fn.38, paras B.2.3.2.35–B.2.3.2.37.
46A commentator has argued that the guidance on the financial capacity test is rather limited. See Monsenego, above
fn.43, 15–16.
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mitigation functions (insurance or hedging) and to bear the consequences of the risk if it
materialises.47 Thus, if a functional analysis leads to the finding that the personnel of an entity
make key decisions vis-à-vis the economically significantly risks associated with the relevant
economic activities and the entity has the financial means to assume those risks, then, from a
transfer pricing perspective the risks and the underlying income connected with those risks should
be allocated to that entity.48 Conversely, if a functional analysis in all of the aforementioned
situations leads to the finding that the key decisions vis-à-vis the economically significant risks
associated with the entity’s business are not made by the entity’s personnel but rather the personnel
of another entity in a MNE group then the tax administration of the other entity’s state may
initiate an assessment to accurately delineate the transaction. Essentially, an accurate delineation
would reallocate the underlying income associated with those risks to the other entity.49
2.2. Access to tax treaty benefits
The PPT states that a treaty benefit50 will be denied to the taxpayer when “one of the principal
purposes” of the transaction/arrangement/structure is to obtain that benefit (subjective element51).
In which case the taxpayer is given the opportunity to prove that “granting the benefit is in
accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions” (objective element52).
The expression “one of the principal purposes” raises questions with regard to its interpretation.
It could be argued that the subjective element of the PPT is not satisfied if the taxpayer is able
to demonstrate that its transaction is rational from a commercial and/or economic perspective.
To illustrate this, the authors differentiate between the following two situations53: 1. genuine
intermediary structures used by corporate groups that reflect commercial and economic reality
(economic nexus to a state); and 2. back-to-back arrangements, which are structured through
economic operators and which may not or may lack commercial rationale (these being abusive
arrangements).54
With respect to the first situation, if an objective analysis of all facts and circumstances leads
to the conclusion that the structure is commercially and economically rational then the taxpayer
will not satisfy the subjective element and consequently the treaty benefit will be granted.55 The
OECD Commentary supports this position and indicates:
47 OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, para.1.64; UN, TP Manual (2017), above fn.38, paras B.2.3.2.38–
B.2.3.2.40.
48See Collier and Andrus, above fn.36, 229.
49OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, para.1.66; UN, TP Manual (2017), above fn.38, para.B.2.3.2.36.
50OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.175. For a detailed discussion on this matter, see V.
Chand, The Interaction of Domestic Anti-Avoidance Rules with Tax Treaties (with special considerations for the
BEPS project) (Zurich: Schulthess, 2018), s.9.3.2; De Broe (2016), above fn.15, 210; Danon (2018), above fn.15, 42.
51 For a critical discussion on this element, see De Broe and Luts, above fn.15, 132; De Broe (2016), above fn.15,
237–238; Chand, above fn.50, s.9.3.3.
52For a critical discussion on this element, see Chand, above fn.50, s. 9.3.4; De Broe, above fn.15, EU Law, 213.
53The authors restrict themselves to these two situations for the purpose of the contribution. Other fact patterns can
of course also be analysed under the PPT (such as rule shopping schemes).
54Another author has recently differentiated between these two situations while analysing the PPT, see S. vanWeeghel,
“A Deconstruction of the Principal Purposes Test” (2019) 11 World Tax Journal 3.
55See, e.g. Carrefour decision (South Korea, 2012du16466, 2014.7.10), where the court ruled that a Dutch BV was
not a conduit company as it had several subsidiaries, physical substance, discretionary authority over cash and was
not established for the purpose of tax avoidance.
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“[W]here an arrangement is inextricably linked to a core commercial activity,…it is unlikely
that its principal purpose will be considered to be to obtain that benefit.” (Emphasis added.)56
This conclusion can also be derived from several examples discussed in the OECD
Commentary with respect to the PPT.57 For instance, referring to the fact patterns that deal with
intermediary companies, that are owned by third state residents, and which have been set up to
carry out core economic activities:
• Example G58 deals with provision of genuine intra group services. In that example,
the intermediary entity (RCO) in State R is given access to treaty benefits. This is
because of commercial and economic aspects. The first aspect relates to commercial
reasons for selecting State R. After considering different locations, TCO chooses
State R because of the availability of a skilled work force, a dependable legal
system, a business friendly setting, political stability, membership of a regional
block, a sophisticated banking industry and the comprehensive double taxation
treaty network of State R, including its tax treaties with the five states in which
TCO owns subsidiaries. The second aspect relates to the relevant economic activities
carried out by the intermediary in State R. The Commentary states:
“Assuming that the intra-group services to be provided by RCO, including
the making of decisions necessary for the conduct of its business, constitute
a real business through which RCO exercises substantive economic functions,
using real assets and assuming real risks, and that business is carried on by
RCO through its own personnel located in State R, it would not be reasonable
to deny the benefits of the treaties concluded [by] State R.”59
• Example H60 deals with investment activities carried out by an operating entity
through debt and equity investments. In that example, the intermediary entity
(RCO) in State R is given access to treaty benefits on the interest and dividend
income. This is because of the following two main aspects. The first aspect relates
to commercial aspects, that is, non-tax reasons for the establishment of RCO in
State R and the reasons for selecting State R. The facts indicate that TCO had
difficulties in conducting its international business from State T mainly because
of issues related to transportation, time differences, limited availability of personnel
fluent in foreign languages and the foreign location of business partners. Thus, in
order to develop a base for its foreign business activities, TCO establishes RCO.
Moreover, State R is selected because of its developed international trade and
financial markets and abundance of highly qualified human resources. The second
aspect relates to the relevant economic activities carried out by the intermediary
in State R. The facts state that RCO carries on diverse business activities such as
56OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.181.
57On the importance of the OECD Commentary, see Danon (2018), above fn.15, 48–50.
58OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.182, Example G.
59OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.182, Example G.
60OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.182, Example H.
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wholesaling, retailing, manufacturing, financing and domestic and international
investment. RCO’s employees (personnel working in areas such as legal, finance,
accounting, taxation, risk management, auditing and internal control) perform these
activities. Furthermore, RCO possesses the necessary financial resources to conduct
its activities. Consequently, in light of these aspects, it is clear that RCO carries
out genuine economic activities that may constitute an active conduct of business.
Given these facts, RCO’s creation in State R and its investment in SCO are not
driven by the avoidance of taxes in State S. Therefore, the subjective element
should not be satisfied, and the treaty benefit should be granted.
• In Example K,61 the intermediary entity (RCO) that acts as a regional investment
platform is given access to treaty benefits. This is because of the following two
considerations. The first consideration relates to commercial reasons for selecting
State R. The facts indicate that State R was selected because of the availability of
knowledgeable directors with experience of regional business practices and
regulations, the existence of a skilledmultilingual workforce, State R’s membership
of a regional grouping and the extensive tax convention network of State R,
including its tax convention with State S, which provides for low withholding tax
rates. The second consideration relates to the relevant economic activities carried
out by the intermediary in State R. The facts state that RCO’s activities are carried
out by: 1. a board of directors that are comprised of a majority of State R residents
(with expertise in investment management) and the members of the Fund’s global
management team; and 2. an experienced local management team that reviews
investment recommendations from the Fund and performs various other functions
such as approving and monitoring investments, carrying on treasury functions,
maintaining RCO’s books and records, and ensuring compliance with regulatory
requirements in states where it invests. Given these facts, it is clear that RCO’s
creation in State R and its investment in SCO are not driven by the purpose of
avoiding taxes in State S. Therefore, the subjective element should not be satisfied
based on these facts and the treaty benefit should be granted.
On the contrary, if an objective analysis of all facts and circumstances leads to the conclusion
that the main purpose of the arrangement was to obtain a tax benefit then the taxpayer will satisfy
the subjective element.62
Similarly, with respect to the second situation, it is obvious that if a factual analysis of all
facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction leads to the conclusion that the back-to-back
arrangement has been entered into with the principal purpose of obtaining a tax benefit then
there is no doubt that the subjective element should be satisfied. This would typically be the case
when a third state resident uses an economic operator (financial institution or a related entity)
61OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.182, Example K.
62See for instance the fact patterns inMIL (Investments) SA v Canada [2006] 9 ITLR 25 and Alta Energy Luxembourg
SARL v R [2018] 21 ITLR 219.
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for artificial arrangements. For instance, see example A63 and B64 in the Commentary to the PPT
as well as examples A,65 C66 and D67 in the Commentary on anti-conduits. These arrangements
are carried out with the sole purpose of obtaining tax advantages. On the other hand, if the
commercial rationale of such back-to-back arrangements can be demonstrated then the subjective
element should not be satisfied. For instance, refer to the fact patterns that deal with following
back-to-back arrangements:
• Example E68 in the Commentary on anti-conduit arrangements discusses a
back-to-back licensing situation. The Commentary states that treaty benefits should
be granted to the royalty income as RCO (intermediary)
“is conforming to the standard commercial organisation and behaviour of the
group in the way that it structures its licensing and sub-licensing activities
and assuming the same structure is employed with respect to other subsidiaries
carrying out similar activities in countries which have treaties which offer
similar or more favourable benefits”.
In this example, it seems that the treaty benefit is available as long as the taxpayer
is able to demonstrate commercial reasons for setting up the licensing arrangements.
Arguably, from a transfer pricing perspective the majority of the income should
be allocated to the relevant subsidiary as it bears the risks associated with the
development of the intellectual property.
• Example F69 in the Commentary on anti-conduits discusses a back-to-back financing
situation. In this case, treaty benefits are granted to the intermediary treasury (RCO)
63OECDMC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.182, Example A. The facts in this example are similar
to the facts of the 1994 Royal Dutch Oil Company/Marketmaker judgment (Netherlands, Hoge Raad judgment of 6
June 1994, BNB 1994/217). For a detailed analysis of the judgment see L. De Broe, International Tax Planning and
Prevention of Abuse: A Study under Domestic Tax Law, Tax Treaties and EC Law in Relation to Conduit and Base
Companies, Doctoral Series Vol.14 (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2007), 694–697.
64OECDMC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.182, Example B. The facts in this example are similar
to the facts of the 2006 Bank of Scotland judgment. See Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie v
Société Bank of Scotland [2006] 9 ITLR 683.
65OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.187, Example A. The example directly resembles
the fact pattern contained in Example 1 of the Exchange of Letters with respect to the interpretation of the anti-conduit
provision (Art.3(1)(n)) in the 2001 US–UK Tax Treaty.
66OECDMC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article29, para.187, Example C. The example directly resembles the
fact pattern contained in Example 3 of the Exchange of Letters with respect to the interpretation of the anti-conduit
provision (Art.3(1)(n)) in the 2001 US–UK Tax Treaty.
67OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.187, Example D. The example directly resembles
the fact pattern contained in Example 4 of the Exchange of Letters with respect to the interpretation of the anti-conduit
provision (Art.3(1)(n)) in the 2001 US–UK Tax Treaty. Also see Rev. Rul. 87–89, 1987–2, C.B. 195.
68OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.187, Example E. The example directly resembles
the fact pattern contained in Example 5 of the Exchange of Letters with respect to the interpretation of the anti-conduit
provision (Art.3(1)(n)) in the 2001US–UKTax Treaty. For a detailed analysis of Example E, see R. Danon, “Intellectual
Property (IP) Income and Tax Treaty Abuse: Relevance of BEPS Action 5 and 8–10 for the Principal Purpose Test”
in G. Maisto (ed.), Taxation of Intellectual Property under Domestic Law, EU Law and Tax Treaties (Amsterdam:
IBFD, 2018), 17–34.
69OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.187, Example F. The example directly resembles
the fact pattern contained in Example 6 of the Exchange of Letters with respect to the interpretation of the anti-conduit
provision (Art.3(1)(n)) in the 2001 US–UK Tax Treaty.
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entity on the interest income it receives from State S. This is because: 1. RCO is
established with the purpose of carrying out financing activities; 2. RCO carries
out these activities through several employees; 3. RCO employs the relevant assets;
and 4. RCO, through its personnel, assumes the financial risks associated with
those activities such as interest rate and currency risks. Arguably, treaty benefits
are allowed as RCO has demonstrated, through its personnel, that it takes
business-related risks with respect to the underlying income.
If the taxpayer satisfies the subjective element, the question arises as to how the objective
element is to be interpreted. In this regard, the authors submit that a two-stage analysis70 will be
required to ascertain the object and purpose of the “relevant provisions”. Under the first stage,
the taxpayer has to determine the object and purpose of the “relevant provisions”71 in light of the
objectives pursued by the tax treaty (legal analysis). In this context, to the extent that the new
preamble is incorporated in tax treaties, it could be argued that the following objectives shall be
considered in the treaty interpretation process (while interpreting the PPT) as opposed to giving
preference to one particular objective: 1. allocating taxing rights and eliminating double taxation
with a view to promoting cross border flows (such as investments); 2. the prevention of tax
evasion; and 3. prevention of tax avoidance (in particular, treaty shopping). The addition of the
tax avoidance objective will ensure that
“tax conventions apply in accordance with the purpose for which they were entered into,
i.e. to provide benefits in respect of bona fide exchanges of goods and services, and
movements of capital and persons…”.72
Thus, the object and purpose of the “relevant provisions” have to be read in light of the object
and purpose of the entire tax treaty.73 Thereafter, under the second stage, the taxpayer will have
to demonstrate that the transaction/arrangement respects the object and purpose of the “relevant
provisions” at stake (application of the legal analysis to the facts at stake).
For instance, consider a case where a resident of a third state (TCO in State T) sets up a shell
entity/letterbox (RCO in State R) which then invests in shares of a subsidiary (SCO in State S).
The main reason for choosing State R is its tax treaty with State S (Article 13 of the tax treaty
allocates taxing rights on capital gains to the state of residence). Let us assume that the facts
indicate that one of the principal purposes (or the sole purpose) for interposing RCO was to
obtain a tax benefit and hence the subjective element is satisfied. With respect to the application
of the objective element, under the first stage, the taxpayer will establish that: 1. the object and
70See Canada Trustco Mortgage Co v Canada [2005] 2 SCR 601; 2005 SCC 54 (CanLII) at [44]–[62]; Chand, above
fn.50, s.9.3.4.
71Arguably, the PPT becomes redundant if only the object and purpose of the “relevant provisions” are considered.
This is because, in a tax avoidance scheme, a resident taxpayer always respects the formal conditions of tax treaties
such as the conditions imposed by the time limit provisions (OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Art.5(3)), ownership
threshold (OECDMC 2017 Art.10(2)) or the relevant distributive rule (for instance, OECDMC 2017 Arts 10, 11, 12
and 13). Accordingly, such an approach that focuses on a literal interpretation of ordinary treaty terms should be
rejected. See Chand, above fn.50, s.9.3.4.
72OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.174.
73Moreover, to the extent relevant, other treaty objectives such as elimination of tax discrimination as provided in
OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Art.24 and the establishment of a mutual agreement procedure (MAP) as per OECD
MC 2017 Art.25 should be taken into consideration. See Chand, above fn.50, s.9.3.4.
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purpose of Article 13 is to allocate taxing rights vis-à-vis capital gains; and 2. the object and
purpose of tax treaties is to: (a) allocate taxing rights and eliminate double taxation with a view
to promoting cross border investments; (b) prevent tax evasion; and (c) prevent tax avoidance.
Under the second stage, RCO will be able to demonstrate that it has acted in accordance with:
1. the object and purpose of Article 13 as it has complied with its formal conditions for applying
the treaty in the sense that it is a person, a resident and its income falls under the distributive
rule that deals with capital gains; and 2. the object and purpose of tax treaties as: (a) it has
complied with the intent of such tax treaties which is to promote cross border investment, that
is, it invests in State S; and (b) the transaction does not represent a tax evasion scheme. With
respect to (c) it will be difficult for RCO to prove that its transaction represents a “genuine”/“bona
fide” transaction, as an objective analysis of the facts would indicate the presence of a high
degree of “artificiality” (as it is a letterbox). Therefore, the PPT would apply as the taxpayer
may not be able to establish that the principal purpose of seeking the tax benefit was within the
object, spirit and purpose of the provisions that confer the tax benefit. This said, the analysis of
the subjective and objective element will be different if the taxpayer is able to demonstrate a
commercial and/or economic rationale with respect to the arrangements (for instance, as explained
in examples G, H and K above).
Similarly, in back-to-back arrangements as discussed in examples A and B in the Commentary
to the PPT as well as examples A and C in the Commentary on anti-conduits, it will be difficult
for the taxpayer to prove that the principal purpose of seeking the tax benefit was within the
object, spirit and purpose of the provisions that confer the tax benefit. This said, the analysis of
the objective element will be different if the taxpayer is able to demonstrate a commercial
rationale of its arrangements (for instance, as explained in examples E and F above).
2.3. Access to EU tax law
2.3.1. Abuse of rights doctrine in EU law
It is clear from CJEU case law that a taxpayer entity (an economic operator) cannot invoke EU
law (treaty freedoms) in fraudulent situations (for instance sham/simulated transactions or false
declarations).74On the other hand, for transactions that are legally effective, an economic operator
cannot access treaty freedoms in abusive situations. In this regard, it is argued that the CJEU
74 For instance, see the following CJEU decisions: Van Binsbergen v Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid
(C-33/74) [1974] ECR 1299 at [13]; Alexandros Kefalas and Others v Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State) and Organismos
Oikonomikis Anasygkrotisis Epicheiriseon AE (OAE) (C-367/96) [1998] ECR I-2843 at [20]; Dionysios Diamantis
v Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State) and Organismos Ikonomikis Anasygkrotisis Epicheiriseon AE (OAE) (C-373/97)
[2000] ECR I-1705 at [33]; I/S Fini H v Skatteministeriet (C-32/03) [2005] ECR I-1599 at [32].
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has created an “abuse of rights” doctrine75 and that this doctrine may be used to interpret EU
law.76
With respect to the application of the doctrine in non-direct tax matters, the CJEU in
Emsland-Stärke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas77 and Halifax plc and others v CC&E
(Halifax)78 has developed a two-fold, that is, subjective and objective, test in order to determine
whether or not abuse has arisen. Abuse will be determined to have arisen when the economic
operator exercises its right to free movement with the sole intention (or principal, essential or
predominant intention)79 of obtaining benefits through artificial schemes and granting the benefits
would be contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of EU law (primary or
secondary law).80
Recent judgments of the CJEU in the context of the IRD81 and PSD82 confirm the position that
this doctrine can be invoked by Member States to deny protection in harmonised areas of direct
taxation within the EU.83 This said, it could be argued that the doctrine should not apply to
structures or arrangements that are rational from a commercial and/or economic perspective (this
matter is further discussed in section 2.3.3).
75 For instance, see the following CJEU case law: J. Knoors v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken (C-115/78)
[1979] ECR 399; Criminal proceedings against Marc Gaston Bouchoucha (C-61/89) [1990] ECR I-3551; R. v
Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, Ex p. Secretary of State for Home Department (C-370/90) [1992]
ECR I-4265; Vereniging Veronica Omroep Organisatie v Commissariaat voor de Media (C-148/91) [1993] ECR
I-487; TV10 SA v Commissariaat voor de Media (C-23/93) [1994] ECR I-4795; Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og
Selskabsstyrelsen (C-212/97) [1999] ECR I-1459.
76For a detailed analysis, see L. De Broe and D. Beckers, “The General Anti-Abuse Rule of the Anti-Tax Avoidance
Directive: An Analysis Against the Wider Perspective of the European Court of Justice’s Case Law on Abuse of EU
Law” (2017) 26 EC Tax Review 133, 136–139; R. de la Feria, “Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law: The
Creation of a New General Principle of EC Law Through Tax” (2008) 45(2) Common Market Law Review 395.
77Emsland-Stärke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (C-110/99) [2000] ECR I-11569 at [52]–[53].
78Halifax plc and others v CC&E (C-255/02) [2006] ECR I-1609 at [74]–[75].
79 On such terminological differences, see C. Öner, “Is Tax Avoidance the Theory of Everything in Tax Law? A
Terminological Analysis of EU Legislation and Case Law” (2018) 27(2) EC Tax Review 96, 105–107; De Broe and
Beckers, above fn.76, 134–135.
80De Broe and Beckers, above fn.76, 133.
81N Luxembourg 1 and others v Skatteministeriet (N Luxembourg 1 and others) (Joined Cases C-115/16, C-118/16,
C-119/16 and C-299/16) EU:C:2019:134 at [96]–[122].
82Skatteministeriet v T Danmark and Y Denmark Aps (T Danmark and Y Denmark Aps) (Joined Cases C-116/16 and
C-117/16) EU:C:2019:135 at [70]–[95].
83 However, whether Member States can apply this doctrine in the area of non-harmonised direct taxation is still
debatable. For a detailed discussion, see: De Broe and Beckers, above fn.76, 137–139. C. Brokelind and P. Wattel in
P.J. Wattel, H. Vermeulen and O. Marres (eds), European Tax Law: Volume I (Full Edition), 7th edn (Alphen aan
den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2018), 666–667.
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2.3.2. Domestic anti-abuse measures (CFC rules) and EU law
Broadly, when the CJEU84 analyses the compatibility of a domestic rule (including national
anti-avoidance rules) with treaty freedoms,85 as a first step, it analyses whether that national rule
leads to a restriction or discrimination. In this regard, with respect to CFC rules, in Cadbury
Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v IRC (Cadbury Schweppes),86 it was held
that the UK CFC rules constituted a restriction on the freedom of establishment as they deterred
UK companies from setting up subsidiaries overseas whereas the rules did not apply to domestic
subsidiaries.
If an obstacle to free movement arises, then the CJEU analyses whether the national law
measure can be justified by overriding reasons of public interest. For national direct tax law
measures that amount to obstacles, the CJEU has accepted justifications87 such as the need to
maintain the coherence of a tax system,88 the need to protect balanced allocation of taxing rights,89
the need for effective fiscal supervision90 and the need to prevent tax evasion and avoidance or
abuse of law. With respect to the tax avoidance justification, the CJEU has held that national
legislation that reduces the risk of tax avoidance could be justified, subject to the proportionality
requirement.91
With respect to the proportionality test, the CJEU in the Cadbury Schweppes judgment held
that UK CFC rules could be proportional only if they apply to wholly artificial arrangements.
However, if they apply to arrangements that encompass economic reality then such rules will
be contrary to the freedom of establishment provisions even though the arrangement contained
tax motives. In the CJEU’s verdict, “wholly artificial arrangements” exist when the CFC does
not have any “premises, staff and equipment”92 and can be characterised as a “letterbox”.93
84 Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v Finanzamt Steinfurt (C-324/00) [2002] ECR I-11779 at [26]; Test Claimants in the
Thin Cap Group Litigation v IRC (Test Claimants Thin Cap Group) (C-524/04) [2007] ECR I-2107 at [25]; NV
Lammers & Van Cleeff v Belgische Staat (Lammers & Van Cleeff) (C-105/07) [2008] ECR I-173 at [12]; also see
Wattel, European Tax Law, above fn.83, 45–49; De Broe, above fn.63, 748; A. Armenia and A. Zalasinski, “EU
Report” in IFA, The taxation of foreign passive income for groups of companies, Cahiers de droit fiscal international
(2013) Vol.98a, 58.
85Armenia and Zalasinski, above fn.84, 59; Wattel, European Tax Law, above fn.83, 61–76.
86Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v IRC (C-196/04) [2006] ECR I-7995; [2006] STC
1908 at [46]. Also see Commission v United Kingdom (Commission v UK) (C-112/14) EU:C:2014:2369 at [20].
87Wattel, European Tax Law, above fn.83, 70–76.
88Hanns-Martin Bachmann v Belgian State (C-204/90) [1992] ECR I-249 at [21]–[28]. It should be noted that this
justification has been rejected in several direct tax cases pursuant to this judgment. Wattel, European Tax Law, above
fn.83, 73.
89N v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Oost/kantoor Almelo (C-470/04) [2006] ECR I-7409 at [41]–[49].
90Futura Participations and Singer v Administration des contributions (C-250/95) [1997] ECR I-2471 at [31]–[35];
Skatteverket v A (C-101/05) [2007] ECR I-11531 at [54]–[55]. Also see A. Zalasinski, “Proportionality of
Anti-Avoidance and Anti-Abuse Measures in the ECJ’s Direct Tax Case Law” (2007) 35(5) Intertax 310, 315.
91Zalasinski, above fn.90, 315–321. It is also foreseeable that the CJEU may accept a tax avoidance justification in
conjunction with other justifications. See Brokelind and Wattel, above fn.83, 667–670.
92Cadbury Schweppes (C-196/04), above fn.86, [2006] ECR I-7995 at [67].
93Cadbury Schweppes (C-196/04), above fn.86, [2006] ECR I-7995 at [68]. In line with this argument, the attribution
of gain rules, as discussed in the Commission v UK case, was also held to violate the free movement of capital
provisions as it applied in a general way and was not restricted to wholly artificial arrangements. See Commission v
UK (C-112/14), above fn.86, EU:C:2014:2369 at [28]–[29].
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Article 7 of the ATAD provides for CFC rules. However, Article 7(2)(a) carves out the
application of CFC rules when the CFC carries on “substantive economic activity supported by
staff, equipment, assets and premises, as evidenced by relevant facts and circumstances”. The
carve-out clearly reflects the CJEU’s view expressed in theCadbury Schweppes case. Accordingly,
it could be argued that CFC rules are incompatible with the freedom of establishment provisions94
if they apply to entities that carry out genuine economic activities,95 that is, entities that are
rational from a commercial and/or economic perspective. In fact, the German Federal Tax Court
recently also held that the German CFC rules could not be applied to a CFC in Cyprus as the
Cypriot entity carried out economic activity.96 Moreover, the income inclusion rule discussed in
Article 7(2)(b) ATAD should also not be applicable as long as the taxpayer satisfies the relevant
economic activities test. The ATAD, on the other hand, does not preclude Member States from
excluding the above carve-out from EU–third state situations. However, if a Member State
applies the ATADCFC rule to entities in third states which carry out genuine economic activities,
it could be argued that such a rule, in certain situations, conflicts with the free movement of
capital provisions.97
2.3.3. Abuse under corporate tax directives
2.3.3.1. PSD and IRD: domestic or agreement-based measures In order to combat abuse, Article
1(4) of the PSD98 and Article 5(1) of the IRD99 respectively provide that the directives “shall not
preclude the application of domestic or agreement-based provisions required for the prevention
of fraud or abuse”. These provisions therefore allow the application of domestic anti-avoidance
94See Öner, above fn.79, 107-110; A. Cordewener, “Anti Abuse Measures in Direct Taxation: Towards Converging
Standards under Treaty Freedoms and EU Directives” (2017) 26(2) EC Tax Review 60, 61–63.
95 In the context of interaction of domestic thin capitalisation rules with EU law, the CJEU has held that such rules
could be incompatible with the freedom of establishment/free movement of capital provisions if they are not predicated
on an assessment of objective and verifiable elements for the purposes of determining whether a transaction represents
a “wholly artificial arrangement”. Even if the rules provide elements for determining the existence of a “wholly
artificial arrangement” such rules could be found incompatible if the taxpayer is not provided with an opportunity to
provide a commercial justification (without being subject to administrative hassles) and such rules make profit
adjustments to the borrower that exceed the arm’s length standard. See CJEU: Test Claimants Thin Cap Group
(C-524/04), above fn.84, [2007] ECR I-2107 at [80]–[83]; Lammers & Van Cleeff (C-105/07), above fn.84, [2008]
ECR I-173, [28]–[29]; Itelcar - Automóveis de Aluguer Lda v Fazenda Pública (Itelcar) (C-282/12) EU:C:2013:629
at [37]–[38]; Société de Gestion Industrielle SA (SGI) v Belgian State (C-311/08) EU:C:2010:26 at [71]–[72]. Also
see Öner, above fn.79, 110–111; moreover, if the outcome of applying a domestic anti-avoidance rule is not clear or
is ambiguous such a rule may fail to be proportional; Itelcar (C-282/12), above, EU:C:2013:629 at [44]. Brokelind
and Wattel, above fn.83, 679; De Broe and Beckers, above fn.76, 135.
96Bundesfinanzhof (Germany) judgment of 13 June 2018, I R 94/15. For the applicability of EU CFC rules to entities
established outside the EU, see R. Danon, “EU Fiscal Protectionism versus Free Movement of Capital: The Case of
the ATADCFCCategorialModel” in P. Pistone (ed.), European Tax Integration: Law, Policy and Politics (Amsterdam:
IBFD, 2018), 387–407.
97A commentator argues that the free movement of capital provisions would apply to a CFC rule that is designed on
the basis of ATAD Art.7(1)(a). This is because that rule also applies to parent entities that are entitled to “receive
more than 50 percent of the profits” of the CFC. Moreover, by referring to the SECIL case (SECIL - Companhia
Geral de Cal e Cimento SA v Fazenda Pública (C-464/14) EU:C:2016:896), the commentator argues that a
disproportional restriction arises when the CFC rules apply to genuine third state situations. See Danon, above fn.96,
397–407.
98Directive (EU) 2015/121.
99Directive 2003/49/EC.
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rules (domestic safeguard clause hereinafter) as well as tax treaty anti-abuse rules (treaty safeguard
clause hereinafter) to deny directive related benefits.
Prior to entering into a discussion on the domestic safeguard provision of the PSD and IRD,
it should be noted that pursuant to Article 11(1)(a) (first sentence) of theMerger Directive (MD)100
its benefits will be denied when a reorganisation “has as its principal objective or as one of its
principal objectives tax evasion or tax avoidance”. It is further provided (second sentence) that
“the fact that one of the operations referred to in Article 1 is not carried out for valid
commercial reasons such as the restructuring or rationalization of the activities of the
companies participating in the operation may constitute a presumption that the operation
has tax evasion or tax avoidance as its principal objective or as one of its principal
objectives”.
While implementing Article 11(1)(a) of the MD into their national legislation, different
Member States have adopted either domestic anti-avoidance rules of a general nature or
predetermined criteria in order to deny directive related benefits. This had led tax administrations
to deny benefits even in non-abusive situations. However, in several cases, such as A. Leur-Bloem
v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen Amsterdam 2 (Leur-Bloem),101 Modehuis A.
Zwijnenburg BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën (Zwijnenburg),102 Foggia - Sociedade Gestora
de Participações Sociais SA v Secretário de Estado dos Assuntos Fiscais (Foggia)103 and Euro
Park Service v Ministre des finances et des comptes publics (Europark),104 the CJEU has held
that national anti-avoidance measures that are drafted as general rules or presumptions to exclude
certain categories of transactions from tax advantages to deny directive benefits could be
disproportionate. Moreover, it was held in HansMarkus Kofoed v Skatteministeriet (Kofoed),105
by referring to the Cadbury Schweppes judgment, that the anti-abuse rules in Article 11(1)(a)
“[reflect] the general Community law principle that abuse of rights is prohibited”. The foregoing
discussion supports the premise that domestic anti-abuse rules can be applied to the extent that
they are applicable to wholly artificial arrangements.
With respect to the application of domestic anti-abuse rules to the PSD, the CJEU, in Eqiom
SAS, formerly Holcim France SAS and Enka SA v Ministre des Finances et des Comptes publics
(Eqiom)106 as well as the joined cases of Deister Holding AG and Juhler Holding A/S v
100 Council Directive 2009/133/EC of 19 October 2009 on the common system of taxation applicable to mergers,
divisions, partial divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member
States and to the transfer of the registered office of an SE or SCE between Member States [2009] OJ L310/34. See
Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions,
transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member States [1990] OJ L225/1
Art.11; Directive 2009/133/EC Art.15.
101A. Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen Amsterdam 2 (C-28/95) EU:C:1997:369 at [48(b)].
102Modehuis A. Zwijnenburg BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën (C-352/08) EU:C:2010:282, at [44].
103Foggia - Sociedade Gestora de Participações Sociais SA v Secretário de Estado dos Assuntos Fiscais (C-126/10)
EU:C:2011:718 at [37].
104Euro Park Service v Ministre des finances et des comptes publics (C-14/16) EU:C:2017:177 at [57].
105Hans Markus Kofoed v Skatteministeriet (C-321/05) [2007] ECR I-5795 at [38].
106Eqiom SAS, formerly Holcim France SAS and Enka SA v Ministre des Finances et des Comptes publics (C-6/16)
EU:C:2017:641.
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Bundeszentralamt für Steuern (Deister Holding and Juhler Holding),107 held, as a starting point,
that the directive provision authorising a reference to the domestic safeguard clause should be
interpreted strictly.108 Specifically, by referring to the Cadbury Schweppes decision, the CJEU
held that such domestic rules can be applied pursuant to the domestic safeguard clause only if
their specific objective is to “prevent conduct involving the creation of wholly artificial
arrangements which do not reflect economic reality”.109 Moreover, the CJEU held that domestic
anti-avoidance rules that are drafted as general rules or presumptions to deny PSD benefits could
be disproportionate.110 The CJEU then analysed the French and German domestic anti-abuse
rules in light of the foregoing discussion and held that those rules were not proportional as they
were based on presumptions and went beyond the wholly artificial arrangement threshold.111
Thus, it could be argued that domestic anti-abuse rules should not apply to structures or
arrangements that are rational from a commercial and/or economic perspective. Interestingly,
in the context of discussing artificial arrangements, the CJEU in Deister Holding and Juhler
Holding has held that
“the fact that the economic activity of a non-resident parent company consists in the
management of its subsidiaries’ assets or that the income of that company results only from
such management cannot per se indicate the existence of a wholly artificial arrangement
which does not reflect economic reality”.112
These findings of the CJEU support the contention that holding companies cannot be
systematically considered as wholly artificial arrangements under EU law.113
In line with the principles established with respect to the domestic safeguard clause, it could
be argued that the application of a treaty anti-abuse rule pursuant to the treaty safeguard clause
should also be interpreted strictly. This would imply that a treaty anti-abuse clause could apply
if its specific objective is to prevent wholly artificial arrangements. For instance, the PPT can
be applied only to the extent that it denies benefits vis-à-vis wholly artificial arrangements or
arrangements that are not commercially rational.114 In fact, the EU Commission has identified
that potential frictions could arise between the PPT and the CJEU’s case law on abuse. Thus, it
107Deister Holding AG and Juhler Holding A/S v Bundeszentralamt für Steuern (Joined Cases C-504/16 and C-613/16)
EU:C:2017:1009.
108Eqiom (C-6/16), above fn.106, EU:C:2017:641 at [26];Deister Holding and Juhler Holding (Joined Cases C-504/16
and C-613/16), above fn.107, EU:C:2017:1009 at [59].
109Eqiom (C-6/16), above fn.106, EU:C:2017:641 at [30];Deister Holding and Juhler Holding (Joined Cases C-504/16
and C-613/16), above fn.107, EU:C:2017:1009 at [60].
110Eqiom (C-6/16), above fn.106, EU:C:2017:641 at [31]–[32]; Deister Holding and Juhler Holding (Joined Cases
C-504/16 and C-613/16), above fn.107, EU:C:2017:1009 at [61]–[62].
111 Eqiom (C-6/16), above fn.106, EU:C:2017:641 at [33]–[38]; Deister Holding and Juhler Holding (Joined Cases
C-504/16 and C-613/16), above fn.107, EU:C:2017:1009 at [63]–[71].
112 Deister Holding and Juhler Holding (Joined Cases C-504/16 and C-613/16), above fn.107, EU:C:2017:1009 at
[73].
113Danon (2018), above fn.15, 47.
114 It has been argued that the PPT rule could be contrary to the proportionality principle in EU law. This is because
the CJEU’s case law sets a higher threshold to determine the existences of abuse, that is, abuse arises only when the
essential aim, sole aim or sole purpose of the transaction/arrangement is to obtain a tax benefit. Moreover, it is argued
that the PPT rule can be challenged on the basis that it creates legal uncertainty. See De Broe (2016), above fn.15,
237–238; P. Baker, “The BEPS Action Plan in the Light of EU Law: Treaty Abuse” [2015] BTR 408, 412–414; a
similar analogy should also be drawn for various provisions of the simplified or detailed LOB clause.
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has recommended that Member States adopt a modified version of the PPT.115 Consequently,
treaty anti-abuse rules should not apply to structures or arrangements that are rational from a
commercial and/or economic perspective.
2.3.3.2. IRD, PSD and ATAD: General Anti-Abuse Rules Article 5(2) of the IRD116 states that EU
Member States can deny the benefits of the IRD
“in the case of transactions for which the principal motive or one of the principal motives
is tax evasion, tax avoidance or abuse” (subjective element).
The PSD also contains a GAAR.117 Article 1(2) of the PSD provides that the PSD GAAR
applies when an arrangement or a series of arrangements: 1. has/have been put into place for
“the main purpose or one of the main purposes” of obtaining a tax advantage (subjective element);
2. that defeats the “object or purpose of this Directive” (objective element); and 3. is/are “not
genuine having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances”. Article 1(3) of the PSD provides
that arrangements could be regarded as not genuine to the extent they are not put into place “for
valid commercial reasons which reflect economic reality”118 (non-genuine element). Similar to
the PSD GAAR, Article 6(1) of the ATAD states that the GAAR applies when an arrangement
or a series of arrangements: 1. has/have been put into place for “the main purpose or one of the
main purposes” of obtaining a tax advantage (subjective element); 2. that “defeats the object or
purpose of the applicable tax law” (objective element); 3. is/are “not genuine having regard to
all relevant facts and circumstances”. Article 6(2) of the ATAD provides arrangements could
be regarded as not genuine to the extent they are not put into place “for valid commercial reasons
which reflect economic reality” (non-genuine element).
The question arises as to how should the subjective, objective and non-genuine elements be
interpreted? In this regard, it should be noted that in the Danish cases that deal with the IRD (Z
Denmark,119 N Luxembourg,120 X Denmark121 and C Danmark122) and the PSD (T Danmark123 & Y
Denmark124) the Advocate General (AG) has provided additional guidance on the concept of
abuse, that is, criteria for determining abuse and application of those criteria to various fact
patterns. In fact, while delivering her Opinion, the AG makes several references to the ATAD
GAAR. Accordingly, references are made to her Opinion to understand how these elements can
be interpreted in the case of directive shopping arrangements.
With respect to the criteria for determining abuse under EU law, the AG states, as a starting
point, that Article 5 of the IRD and Article 1(2) of the PSD reflect the general principles of EU
law (or settled case law) which provide that the application of EU law cannot be extended to
115See Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/136 of 28 January 2016 on the implementation of measures against
tax treaty abuse (notified under document C(2016) 271) [2016] OJ L25/67, 68.
116See Directive 2003/49/EC Art.5(2).
117Directive (EU) 2015/121 Art.1(2).
118Directive (EU) 2015/121 Art.1(3).
119Opinion of AG Kokott in Z Denmark v Skatteministeriet (C-299/16) EU:C:2018:148 (1 March 2018).
120Opinion of AG Kokott in N Luxembourg 1 v Skatteministeriet (C-115/16) EU:C:2018:143 (1 March 2018).
121Opinion of AG Kokott in X Denmark A/S v Skatteministeriet (C-118/16) EU:C:2018:146 (1 March 2018).
122Opinion of AG Kokott in C Danmark I v Skatteministeriet (C-119/16) EU:C:2018:147 (1 March 2018).
123Opinion of AG Kokott in Skatteministeriet v T Danmark (C-116/16) EU:C:2018:144 (1 March 2018).
124Opinion of AG Kokott in Skatteministeriet v Y Denmark Aps (C-117/16) EU:C:2018:145 (1 March 2018).
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abusive transactions. As Article 5 of the IRD and Article 1(2) of the PSD do not define abuse
and, thus, in order to lay out the criteria for determining abuse, the AG, first, makes a reference
to Article 11(1)(a) of the MD (which provides that lack of commercial reasons could indicate
abuse) and Article 6 of the ATAD (which defines abuse).125 Secondly, the AG makes a reference
to the CJEU’s decisions in which the Court held that a taxpayer’s transaction is abusive when
its essential aim is to obtain a tax advantage (see section 2.3.1) or it represents a wholly artificial
arrangement, which does not reflect economic reality126 (see section 2.3.2). Thereafter, the AG
applies the foregoing criteria to the various cases at stake.
With respect to the existence of a wholly artificial arrangement that does not reflect economic
reality, the AG in the C Danmark case opines:
“The two intermediary Swedish companies (C Sverige II and C Sverige I) did not have any
employees, any office premises of their own, any telephone numbers of their own. Their
post was opened by employees of a third-party company. As a result, these companies
neither incurred any staff costs nor any costs for use of the premises. Moreover, they did
not generate any income of their own through the asset management activities. All of this
appears very artificial. A natural person would have long since ceased its business activities
under these circumstances.”127
A similar outcome is also followed in the Y Danmark case.128 On the contrary, in the other
cases, the AG opines:
“If the company has been actually validly established, if it can actually be contacted at its
registered office and if it has the appropriate physical and human resources at its premises
in order to meet its object…, it cannot be seen as an arrangement which does not reflect
economic reality.”129
Moreover, even if the arrangement reflects economic reality, the AG, by referring to Article
6 of the EU ATAD, states that the taxpayer’s transaction should have a commercial rationale,
that is, non-tax reasons have to be demonstrated.130 If not, the transaction could be abusive.
Although the AG does not discuss commercial reasons, she nevertheless states that the fact that
125Opinions of AGKokott in ZDenmark (C-299/16), above fn.119, EU:C:2018:148 at [61];N Luxembourg (C-115/16),
above fn.120, EU:C:2018:143 at [62]; X Denmark (C-118/16), above fn.121, EU:C:2018:146 at [62]; C Danmark
(C-119/16), above fn.122, EU:C:2018:147 at [62]; T Danmark (C-116/16), above fn.123, EU:C:2018:144 at [50]; Y
Denmark (C-117/16), above fn.124, EU:C:2018:145 at [49].
126Opinions of AGKokott in ZDenmark (C-299/16), above fn.119, EU:C:2018:148 at [62];N Luxembourg (C-115/16),
above fn.120, EU:C:2018:143 at [63]; X Denmark (C-118/16), above fn.121, EU:C:2018:146 at [63]; C Danmark
(C-119/16), above fn.122, EU:C:2018:147 at [63]; T Danmark (C-116/16), above fn.123, EU:C:2018:144 at [51]; Y
Denmark (C-117/16), above fn.124, EU:C:2018:145 at [50].
127Opinion of AG Kokott in C Danmark (C-119/16), above fn.122, EU:C:2018:147 at [63].
128Opinion of AG Kokott in Y Denmark (C-117/16), above fn.124, EU:C:2018:145 at [54].
129Opinion of AGKokott in ZDenmark (C-299/16), above fn.119, EU:C:2018:148 at [65];N Luxembourg (C-115/16),
above fn.120, EU:C:2018:143 at [67]; X Denmark (C-118/16), above fn.121, EU:C:2018:146 at [67]; T Danmark
(C-116/16), above fn.123, EU:C:2018:144 at [55].
130Opinion of AGKokott in ZDenmark (C-299/16), above fn.119, EU:C:2018:148 at [67];N Luxembourg (C-115/16),
above fn.120, EU:C:2018:143 at [68]; X Denmark (C-118/16), above fn.121, EU:C:2018:146 at [68]; C Danmark
(C-119/16), above fn.122, EU:C:2018:147 at [69]; T Danmark (C-116/16), above fn.123, EU:C:2018:144 at [59]; Y
Denmark (C-117/16), above fn.124, EU:C:2018:145 at [58].
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the intermediary company is established in a Member State in order to take advantage of a
favourable legal regime, the fact that the intermediary company is owned by third state residents
or the fact that the taxpayer chose a business structure that did not lead to the highest tax burden
does not in itself constitute abuse.131
The foregoing analysis, provided by the AG, may be used to interpret the
subjective/non-genuine elements of the GAAR-type provisions found in the corporate tax
directives. In line with the discussion put forward by the AG, it could be argued that the subjective
element as well as the non-genuine elements should not be satisfied if the taxpayer is able to
demonstrate that its transaction/structure/arrangement is rational from a commercial and/or an
economic reality perspective. Once again the two situations need to be differentiated. That is,
on the one hand: 1. genuine intermediary structures used by corporate groups that reflect
commercial and economic reality; and, on the other 2. back-to-back arrangements, which are
structured through economic operators and which may or may not lack a commercial rationale
(see the discussion on the subjective element of the PPT in section 2.2). With respect to the
economic reality or activities, the AG in the Eqiom case specifically stated that
“an artificial arrangement can be assumed if the company is only a fictitious establishment
in the form of a ‘letterbox’ company…But even where there is a physical presence, one
might conclude, in light of the financial and staffing set-up, that the arrangement is artificial.
In this regard, what appears to be relevant is, for instance, the actual authority of the company
organs to take decisions, to what extent the company is endowed with own financial means
and whether any commercial risk exists.” (Emphasis added.)132
This outcome is not something new as a discussion along these lines seems to have already
taken place in AG Léger’s Opinion in the Cadbury Schweppes case.133 Arguably, it becomes
imperative that the personnel of the taxpayer entity make key decisions vis-à-vis the economically
significant risks associated with the relevant economic activities and that the entity has the
financial means to assume those risks (see section 2.1).
The AG also analyses whether the arrangement is contrary to the objective of the PSD or the
IRD as implemented in Denmark. In this regard, it is stated that the taxpayers fulfilled all the
requirements for applying the PSD (Article 2)134 and the IRD (Article 3(a)(iii)).135 The fact that
Cyprus or Luxembourg do not impose withholding taxes is immaterial to the analysis as direct
taxation remains largely within each Member State’s competence (which could therefore lead
131 Opinions of AG Kokott in Z Denmark (C-299/16), above fn.119, EU:C:2018:148 at [69]–[74]; N Luxembourg
(C-115/16), above fn.120, EU:C:2018:143 at [70]–[75]; X Denmark (C-118/16), above fn.121, EU:C:2018:146 at
[70]–[75];CDanmark (C-119/16), above fn.122, EU:C:2018:147 at [70]–[74]; T Danmark (C-116/16), above fn.123,
EU:C:2018:144 at [61]–[65]; Y Denmark (C-117/16), above fn.124, EU:C:2018:145 at [61]–[65].
132Opinion of AG Kokott in Eqiom SAS, formerly Holcim France SAS and Enka SA v Ministre des Finances et des
Comptes publics (C-6/16) EU:C:2017:34 at [57]. Also see WebMindLicenses Kft v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal
Kiemelt Adó- és Vám Főigazgatóság (C-419/14) EU:C:2015:832 at [50].
133 Opinion of AG Léger in Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v IRC (C-196/04)
EU:C:2006:278 At [110]–[114].
134Opinions of AGKokott in TDanmark (C-116/16), above fn.123, EU:C:2018:144 at [69]–[70]; YDenmark (C-117/16),
above fn.124, EU:C:2018:145 at [68]–[69].
135 Opinions of AG Kokott in Z Denmark (C-299/16), above fn.119, EU:C:2018:148 at [79]–[82]; N Luxembourg
(C-115/16), above fn.120, EU:C:2018:143 at [80]–[83]; X Denmark (C-118/16), above fn.121, EU:C:2018:146 at
[80]–[83]; C Danmark (C-119/16), above fn.122, EU:C:2018:147 at [78]–[81].
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to tax competition).136 Moreover, the AG also analyses whether the entire arrangements, that is,
third state investors investing into Denmark through an intermediary established in a EUMember
State (Luxembourg or Cyprus) is contrary to the purpose of the law. In this regard, the AG states
that the purpose of the law could be circumvented if the state of residence of the income recipients
is not able to obtain information with respect to the amounts not taxed at source and assess that
income for taxes. It seems that the AG analyses whether the arrangement is a tax evasion
arrangement rather than an avoidance arrangement. The AG differentiates between EU–EU
situations and third state-EU situations. For the former, the AG states that it may not be possible
for the taxpayer to avoid declaring the income for tax purposes due to the presence of an
appropriate exchange of information framework.137 For the latter, the AG states that if the
arrangement is structured with the purpose of ensuring that the states of residence of the investors
are unable to obtain information to assess their taxpayers then an abuse of law may exist.
Nevertheless, abuse will not exist if the tax related information can be provided by the taxpayer
to the concerned states.138
The guidance provided by the AG may also be used to interpret the objective element of the
GAAR-type provisions. Clearly, if the purpose of the transaction/structure/arrangement is to
evade taxes then the transaction is fraudulent/abusive. However, in the context of tax avoidance
arrangements that seek to take advantage of the PSD, it is not clear how the expression “object
or purpose of this Directive” should be interpreted. The AG seems to indicate that PSD benefits
should be granted as long as: 1. the distributing entity is subject to corporate taxes; and 2. the
recipient company is subject to unlimited tax liability.139 Such formal conditions are usually
satisfied in tax avoidance structures. Accordingly, there is a risk that transactions, which have
been executed with the sole purpose of obtaining directive benefits, could be “saved” from the
application of the PSD GAAR. This said, if the CJEU considers the prevention of tax avoidance
as an “object or purpose of this Directive” transactions that are “artificial” (or wholly artificial
arrangements) may not be able to get access to directive related benefits (see the discussion on
the objective element of the PPT in section 2.2). A similar approach could also be upheld for
interpreting the objective element of the ATAD GAAR.
2.3.3.3. IRD and PSD: abuse of rights doctrine In February 2019, the CJEU issued its verdict on
the Danish cases discussed in the previous section. The Court held that the abuse of rights doctrine
can be invoked by a Member State to deny directive benefits (IRD/PSD) even if that state does
136Opinions of AGKokott in ZDenmark (C-299/16), above fn.119, EU:C:2018:148 at [83];N Luxembourg (C-115/16),
above fn.120, EU:C:2018:143 at [84]; X Denmark (C-118/16), above fn.121, EU:C:2018:146 at [84]; C Danmark
(C-119/16), above fn.122, EU:C:2018:147 at [82]; T Danmark (C-116/16), above fn.123, EU:C:2018:144 at [71]; Y
Denmark (C-117/16), above fn.124, EU:C:2018:145 at [70].
137 Opinions of AG Kokott, Z Denmark (C-299/16), above fn.119, EU:C:2018:148 at [84]–[85]; N Luxembourg
(C-115/16), above fn.120, EU:C:2018:143 at [85]–[86]; X Denmark (C-118/16), above fn.121, EU:C:2018:146 at
[85]–[86];CDanmark (C-119/16), above fn.122, EU:C:2018:147 at [83]–[84]; T Danmark (C-116/16), above fn.123,
EU:C:2018:144 at [72]–[73]; Y Denmark (C-117/16), above fn.124, EU:C:2018:145 at [72]–[73].
138 Opinions of AG Kokott, Z Denmark, (C-299/16), above fn.119, EU:C:2018:148 at [86]–[88]; N Luxembourg
(C-115/16), above fn.120, EU:C:2018:143 at [87]–[89]; X Denmark (C-118/16), above fn.121, EU:C:2018:146 at
[87]–[89];CDanmark (C-119/16), above fn.122, EU:C:2018:147 at [85]–[87]; T Danmark (C-116/16), above fn.123,
EU:C:2018:144 at [74]–[76]; Y Denmark (C-117/16), above fn.124, EU:C:2018:145 at [74]–[76].
139 T Danmark (C-116/16), above fn.123, EU:C:2018:144 at [69]–[70]; Y Denmark (C-117/16), above fn.124,
EU:C:2018:145 at [68]–[69].
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not have appropriate anti-abuse rules in place to combat abusive transactions (for example,
directive shopping). Thereafter, the CJEU lays out certain indicators of abuse, that is, situations
wherein the arrangements of the taxpayer could be considered to be artificial. According to the
Court, an artificial arrangement exists when the taxpayer (entity in a MNE group) is an artificial
entity or an entity that does not reflect economic reality or a conduit entity. Essentially, this
would be the case when the entity does not carry out any relevant economic activities.140 Another
factor that indicates the presence of an artificial arrangement is when the entity plays a conduit
role, that is, the entity passes on income (dividends or interest), as soon as it receives it, to
taxpayers (or beneficial owners) that are not eligible for the directive related benefits. This would
be the case even if the conduit entity makes a small taxable profit.141 Although this is not
particularly clear, it seems that an artificial arrangement could also exist when back-to-back
arrangements are structured through genuine economic operators.142 In the authors’ opinion, it
can be argued that the doctrine should not apply to structures or arrangements that are rational
from a commercial and/or economic perspective (see discussion on the subjective element of
the PPT in section 2.2 and the subjective/non-genuine elements of the GAAR-type provisions
found in the corporate tax directives in section 2.3.3.2).
2.4. Access to preferential regimes
In December 1977, the EU Code of Conduct for Business Taxation established five criteria to
assess whether a national tax measure (legislative or regulatory or administrative) was potentially
harmful. One criterion looked into whether the tax advantage was granted without any “real
economic activity and substantial economic presence”.143 Similarly, in the 1998 Harmful Tax
Competition report, the OECD laid out four primary and eight supplementary criteria to assess
whether a measure was potentially harmful. One of the supplementary criteria pertained to
looking at whether the tax measure provided for “substantial activities”.144 Since then the Code
of Conduct and the OECD’s Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP) have analysed several
regimes of different states to assess whether they were harmful or not.145 However, neither the
140 The Court states that “the absence of actual economic activity must, in the light of the specific features of the
economic activity in question, be inferred from an analysis of all the relevant factors relating, in particular, to the
management of the company, to its balance sheet, to the structure of its costs and to expenditure actually incurred, to
the staff that it employs and to the premises and equipment that it has”. See N Luxembourg 1 and others (Joined Cases
C-115/16, C-118/16, C-119/16 and C-299/16), above fn.81, EU:C:2019:134 at [127] and [131]; T Danmark and Y
Denmark Aps (Joined Cases C-116/16 and C-117/16), above fn.82, EU:C:2019:135 at [100] and [104].
141 See N Luxembourg 1 and others (Joined Cases C-115/16, C-118/16, C-119/16 and C-299/16), above fn.81,
EU:C:2019:134 at [127]–[130]; T Danmark and Y Denmark Aps (Joined Cases C-116/16 and C-117/16), above fn.82,
EU:C:2019:135 at [100]–[103].
142 See N Luxembourg 1 and others (Joined Cases C-115/16, C-118/16, C-119/16 and C-299/16), above fn.81,
EU:C:2019:134 at [132]; T Danmark and Y Denmark Aps (Joined Cases C-116/16 and C-117/16), above fn.82,
EU:C:2019:135 at [105].
143See Council of the European Union,Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 concerning
taxation policy - Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting
within the Council of 1 December 1997 on a code of conduct for business taxation - Taxation of saving [1998] OJ
C2/1, 1–4.
144OECD, Harmful Tax Competition, An Emerging Global Issue (Paris: OECD Publishing, 1998), 34.
145See Council of European Union, Report: Code of Conduct (Business Taxation), SN 4901/99 (Brussels: 23 November
1999); OECD, Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Report to the 2000 Ministerial Council Meeting And
Recommendations By The Committee On Fiscal Affairs, Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices
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work of the EU nor that of the OECD provided guidance on how the substantial activity criterion
was to be interpreted.146
The BEPS Project reignited the debate on harmful tax competition. Action 5 of the BEPS
Plan mandated the FHTP “to revamp the work on harmful tax practices, with a priority and
renewed focus on requiring substantial activity for any preferential regime”.147 As a result, the
substantial activity criterion was elevated to a primary criterion.148 The final report discusses the
applicability of the substantial activity criterion in the context of IP regimes (such as IP boxes)
and non-IP regimes.
In the context of IP regimes, the nexus approach was adopted.149 Under the nexus approach,
profits made by a taxpayer utilising an IP box regime are exempt only to the extent the taxpayer
itself incurs the qualifying research and development (R&D) expenses that gave rise to the IP
income. The idea behind the requirement is that taxpayers should actually carry out the activity
and incur the related expenses in order to benefit from the regimes. Importantly, it should be
noted that Action 5 rejected the transfer pricing (TP) approach.150Arguably, under the TP approach
only high level decision-making substance in the entity was required to be demonstrated. The
day-to-day activities associated with developing the IP could be outsourced to related parties.
However, such outsourcing is not possible under the nexus approach.151 Accordingly, it is
reasonable to state that the substance requirements for an entity adopting the nexus approach
are high.152 In other words, merely demonstrating “control over risks” is insufficient. Post-BEPS,
several states have either amended their existing regimes to reflect the nexus approach or have
implemented nexus compliant IP boxes in their domestic tax law.153
In the context of non-IP regimes, the Action 5 final report states that the principles applied
in the nexus approach should continue to apply. Accordingly, the taxpayer can access preferential
regimes “to the extent those taxpayers undertook the core income generating activities required
to produce the type of business income covered by the preferential regime”.154 In the follow up
report, it is indicated that “[c]ore income generating activities presuppose having an adequate
number of full-time employees with necessary qualifications and incurring an adequate amount
of operating expenditures to undertake such activities”.155
In the context of headquarter regimes, the core income generating activities could
(2000); OECD, The OECDs Project on Harmful Tax Practices: 2004 Progress Report (2004); OECD, The OECD’s
Project on Harmful Tax Practices: 2006 Update on Progress in Member Countries (2006).
146 For a detailed discussion, see A.C. dos Santos, “What is Substantial Economic Activity for Tax Purposes in the
Context of the European Union and the OECD Initiatives against Harmful Tax Competition?” (2015) 24(3) EC Tax
Review 166, 166–171.
147Action 5, above fn.2, para.23.
148Action 5, above fn.2, paras 24–25.
149Action 5, above fn.2, para.27. See R. Danon, “General Report” in IFA, Tax Incentives on Research and Development
(R&D), Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2015) Vol.100a, 43–54.
150Action 5, above fn.2, para.27.
151Action 5, above fn.2, paras 49–51.
152Danon, above fn.68, 25.
153 See OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Harmful Tax Practices – 2017 Progress Report on
Preferential Regimes: Inclusive Framework on BEPS: Action 5 (Harmful Tax Practices 2017 Progress Report) (Paris:
OECD Publishing, 2017), 15–18.
154Action 5, above fn.2, paras 70–73.
155See OECD/G20, Harmful Tax Practices 2017 Progress Report, above fn.153, 40.
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“include the key activities giving rise to the particular type of…income received by the
company. For example, they could include taking relevant management decisions, incurring
expenditures on behalf of group entities, and co-ordinating group activities.”156
For instance, a reference can be made to the Global Headquarters Administration regime
(GHA) available in Mauritius157 and Singapore’s Pioneer Certificate Incentive (PC) and
Development and Expansion Incentive (DEI).158 These regimes, which have been approved by
the FHTP,159 grant an eight year tax holding/reduction of corporate tax rates respectively to
qualifying taxpayers. To avail itself of the benefit of the GHA, the taxpayer must employ at least
10 professionals, with at least two at managerial level, and incur an annual expenditure of MUR
5 million.160 On the other hand, to avail itself of the benefit of the PC/DEI initiative, the taxpayer
must employ skilled staff and incur substantial expenditure161 (the number of employees and
expenditure amounts are unspecified).
With respect to financing regimes, the core income generating activities could “include
agreeing funding terms;…setting the terms and duration of any financing…;monitoring and
revising any agreements; and managing any risks”.162 Once again, a reference can be made to
the Global Treasury Activities regime (GTA) available in Mauritius163 and Singapore’s Finance
and Treasury Centre Incentive (FTC).164These regimes, which have been approved by the FHTP,165
grant a five year tax holding/reduction of corporate tax rates respectively to qualifying taxpayers.
To avail itself of the benefit of the GTA, the taxpayer should employ at least four professionals,
with at least one at managerial level, and incur annual expenditure of MUR 2 million.166 On the
other hand, to avail itself of the benefit of the FTC, the taxpayer must employ skilled staff (at
least 10 personnel) and incur expenditure of SGD 3.5 million.167
Nevertheless, for holding companies that only own and manage participations, the Action 5
final report notes that such entities “may not in fact require much substance in order to exercise
their main activity of holding and managing equity participations”.168 This being said, the Report
provides that such entities should
156Action 5, above fn.2, paras 74–75.
157See Financial Services Commission, Mauritius,Circular Letter CL29012018 (29 January 2018), available at: https:
//www.fscmauritius.org/media/4268/tax-holiday-cl-02-feb-18-270416.pdf [Accessed 18 June 2019].
158 See Singapore Economic Development Board, Pioneer Certificate Incentive and Development and Expansion
Incentive (2016), available at: https://www.edb.gov.sg/content/dam/edbsite/downloads/brochures/PC%20and%20DEI
%20Brochure.PDF [Accessed 18 June 2019].
159OECD/G20, Harmful Tax Practices 2017 Progress Report, above fn.153, 18 and 42–43.
160See Financial Services Commission, Mauritius,Circular Letter CL1-121018 (12 October 2018), available at: https:
//lcabelheim.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/cl-on-substance-gb.pdf [Accessed 18 June 2019].
161See Singapore Economic Development Board, above fn.158.
162Action 5, above fn.2, paras 78–79.
163See Financial Services Commission, Mauritius, Circular Letter CL29012018, above fn.157.
164See Singapore Economic Development Board, Finance and Treasury Centre Incentive (2016), available at: https:
//www.edb.gov.sg/content/dam/edbsite/downloads/brochures/FTC%20Brochure.PDF [Accessed 18 June 2019].
165See OECD/G20, Harmful Tax Practices 2017 Progress Report, above fn.153, 19 and 42–43.
166See Financial Services Commission, Mauritius, Circular Letter CL1-121018, above fn.160.
167See Singapore Economic Development Board, Finance and Treasury Centre Incentive, above fn.164.
168Action 5, above fn.2, para.87.
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“respect all applicable corporate law filing requirements and have the substance necessary
to engage in holding andmanaging equity participations (for example, by showing that they
have both the people and the premises necessary for these activities)”.169
More recently, several jurisdictions have adopted substance requirements in their legislation
and provided additional guidance thereto on core income generating activities. These requirements
are similar to those suggested in BEPS Action 5.170 In light of the foregoing analysis, it is
reasonable to conclude that if the relevant economic activities exist in an entity then that entity
should be given access to a preferential regime.
2.5. Synthesis and minimum safeguards for entities in a MNE
A high degree of convergence exists between the post-BEPS concepts171 of substantial activities,
core commercial activity, controls over risks, economic reality and substantial economic activities.
Specifically, these concepts require the presence of personnel (directors and/or employees) who
can contribute meaningfully towards the creation of value or the production of the core income
that the entity receives.172 However, divergences also exist. The exact personnel threshold for
fulfilling each of these concepts seems to be different. Accordingly, an objective answer cannot
be given to the question “how much substance is required” to gain access to the international
corporate tax framework. The answer would indeed depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case. This said, from an economic activity perspective, a taxpayer entity which takes a
specific role within a multinational group should at a minimum perform the following
activities/bear the relevant risks with respect to the underlying income it generates (besides
documenting the commercial reasons for its existence and activities):
• Holding Entity that receives dividend income or capital gains: the core functions
of such an entity relate typically to management activities that are important for
monitoring and protecting the investments.173 The key risks relate to investment
risks to which the entity is exposed.
169Action 5, above fn.2, para.88.
170 See States of Guernsey, Guidance on aspects in relation to the economic substance requirements as issued by
Guernsey, Isle of Man and Jersey (issued 26April 2019) available at: https://www.gov.gg/economicsubstance [Accessed
18 June 2019], 19 and United Arab Emirates, Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 31 of 2019 Concerning Economic
Substance Regulations, available at: https://www.mof.gov.ae/en/lawsAndPolitics/CabinetResolutions/Pages/312019
.aspx [Accessed 26 June 2019].
171On this matter, see S.Wilkie, “NewRules of Engagement? Corporate Personality and the Allocation of “International
Income” and Taxing Rights” in B.J. Arnold (ed.), Tax Treaties After the BEPS Project: a tribute to Jacques Sasseville
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2018), 365–371. The author argues that the BEPS recommendations lift the
corporate veil when intermediation is unwarranted.
172On this matter, see S. Wilkie, “Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles: The License Model” in M. Lang, A. Storck
and R. Petruzzi (eds), Transfer Pricing in a post BEPSWorld (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2016),
94–95.
173For instance, the personnel of the holding entity, among several activities, could provide non-binding advise to the
management of the subsidiaries to improve their performance. It is arguable whether such an activity could be
considered to confer a benefit on the subsidiary in order to justify a charge for a service fee from an arm’s length
perspective. See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines (1979), para.154; OECD, Three Taxation Issues—Transfer
Pricing (1984), paras 38–39; OECD, TPGuidelines 2017, above fn.18, para.7.4 and para.7.10; UN, TPManual (2017),
above fn.38, para.B.4.2.14.
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• Financing Entity that receives interest income: the core functions of such an entity
are that it is engaged in the business of providing intra group loans which relate
typically to activities associated with creating174 and managing loans.175 The key
risks relate to financial risks176 associated with activities such as the credit risk,
interest rate risk and possibly the exchange rate risk.177
• Intellectual Property (IP) Entities that derive royalty income or capital gains: the
core functions of an entity that is engaged in the business of licensing (or selling)
intangibles178 typically relate to activities associated with development (nexus
approach) or acquisition of intangibles, enhancement, maintenance, protection and
exploitation of intangibles (DEMPE activities).179 The key risks180 relate to: 1. the
development risk or acquisition risk associated with the intangible; 2. risks
associated with technology obsolescence and loss of the intangible value; 3. risks
associated with infringement of the intangible; 4. product liability risks occurring
from the use of intangibles; and 5. risks associated with intangible exploitation.181
174For instance, the personnel of the financing entity could engage in the following loan creation activities (inclusive
list): 1. negotiating the terms and conditions of the loans; 2. evaluating the various financial risks associated with the
loan; 3. analysing the credit worthiness of the borrower; 4. undertaking the steps to price a loan; 5. deciding on whether
collateral or securities are required; 6. undertaking steps to formalise the loans, etc.; OECD, 2010 Report on the
Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments (Attribution Report) (2010), available at: https://www.oecd.org
/ctp/transfer-pricing/45689524.pdf [Accessed 26 June 2019], 65–66; Chand, above fn.37, 896–898.
175 For instance, the personnel of the financing entity could engage in the following loan management activities
(inclusive list): 1. undertaking loan support functions such as collecting the interest, monitoring repayments, determining
the value of collaterals; 2. monitoring the financial risks on an ongoing basis by reviewing the credit worthiness of
the borrower, analysing market interest movements, analysing the profitability of the loan; 3. undertaking necessary
steps to hedge risks associated with the loan; 4. deciding on whether refinancing the loan is required or not, etc. See
OECD, Attribution Report, above fn.174, 65; Chand, above fn.37, 896–898.
176 In the context of cash boxes, the revised guidance has made it clear that, if an entity does not control the financial
risks over the debt funding but simply acts on the direction of other members of the MNE group, then: 1. that entity
will not be attributed the profits linked to the financial risks and therefore will be entitled to no more than a risk-free
return or; 2. less than a risk-free return if, for instance, the transaction is not commercially justified and therefore the
non-recognition rules apply. See OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, paras 1.85 and 1.103; UN, TP Manual
(2017), above fn.38, para.B.5.3.35; also see OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, paras 6.61–6.64. Moreover
see, OECD, TPGuidelines 2017, above fn.18, Example 6 in Annex to Ch.VI. Moreover, see OECD, Public Discussion
Draft BEPS Action 8–10, Financial transactions, 3 July–7 September 2018, paras 12–21.
177 For a discussion on these risks, see OECD, Attribution Report, above fn.174, 68; OECD, TP Guidelines 2017,
above fn.18, para.1.72(c); UN, TP Manual (2017), above fn.38, 89–90, Table B.2.4.
178 For a definition and list of common categories intangibles see OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, paras
6.15–6.31; UN, TP Manual (2017), above fn.38, paras B.5.2.5–B.5.2.38.
179 See OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, para.6.12; UN, TP Manual (2017), above fn.38, paras
B.5.3.13–B.5.3.20.
180See OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, Examples 4, 5, 14 in Annex to Ch.VI. On the other hand, in several
examples it is illustrated that the royalty income (or capital gains) would be re-allocated from the legal owner to the
entity that controlled the DEMPE risks. See Examples 1, 2, 3, 15 and 17 in Annex to Ch.VI; also see, UN, TPManual
(2017), above fn.38, para.B.5.3.12 and para.B.5.3.20. Furthermore, see Collier and Andrus, above fn.36, 214–215;
for a detailed analysis of the ownership requirement of the intangibles see S. Wilkie, “The Definition and Ownership
of Intangibles: Inside the Box? Outside the Box? What is the Box?” (2012) 4(3) World Tax Journal 222.
181OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, paras 6.65–6.68; UN, TP Manual (2017), above fn.38, para.B.5.3.22.
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• Principal Entities182 that receive business income: a principal entity (or the
entrepreneurial entity), for example, that is engaged in the business of selling
physical goods usually operates with the support of “assisting” entities183 such as
procurement entities184 that assist in sourcing/buying raw materials, contract or toll
manufactures185 that assist in processing the raw material as well as limited risk
distributors or commissionaires186 that assist in selling the finished product.
Generally, the core functions of a principal entity typically relate to key
decision-making activities associated with the purchase, manufacture as well as
sale of products. The other “assisting” entities usually perform their activities under
the supervision and guidance of the principal. The key risks are risks pertaining
to its value chain, that is, risks relevant to purchasing, processing and selling of
the products.187
Taxpayers within a corporate group should also pay special attention to back-to-back
arrangements that are structured through economic operators (such as other operating members
of the group or financial institutions). The issue with respect to these transactions may not be
the degree of nexus to a state but rather the commercial rationality of such arrangements. If the
taxpayer is able to demonstrate that its arrangements are commercially and/or economically
sound, then that taxpayer should obtain access to tax treaty or EU law related benefits.
3. The key issues in connection with the relevant economic activity test
3.1. The rise in tax uncertainty
It is obvious that if the degree of subjectivity is high in the interpretation process then the chances
of the tax outcome being uncertain are also high. Consequently, the chances of tax disputes
arising together with the risk of double or multiple taxation all increase. This proposition clearly
holds true once the structures adopted by taxpayers become transparent to the tax administrations
through the Master File (which requires the taxpayer to explain its value chain),
Country-by-Country reporting188 as well as spontaneous exchange of rulings.189
182 For a discussion on the principal structure, see OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, para.9.51. In this
contribution, it is assumed that the principal entity does not own intangibles. Nevertheless, the principal entity licenses
the relevant trade or marketing intangibles from another IP entity of the MNE for its business.
183 It should be noted that in the post-BEPS world, these “assisting” entities could trigger a permanent establishment
for the principal entity pursuant to the recommendations made by BEPS Action 7.
184OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, paras 1.169 and 9.2; C. Finnerty, P. Merks, M. Petriccione and R. Russo,
Fundamentals of International Tax Planning (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2007), 201–202.
185OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, paras 2.60, 7.40 and. 9.2; Finnerty, Merks, Petriccione and Russo, above
fn.184, 184–185; M. Cotrut and L. Ambagtsheer-Pakarinen, “Business Restructurings: The Toolkit for Tackling
Abusive International Tax Structures” in M. Cotrut (ed.), International Tax Structures in the BEPS Era: An Analysis
of Anti-Abuse Measures (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2015), 190–194.
186OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, para.9.2; Finnerty, Merks, Petriccione and Russo, above fn.184, 194–198;
Cotrut and Ambagtsheer-Pakarinen, above fn.185, 194–198.
187For a discussion on the risks that a MNE could be exposed towards see UN, TPManual (2017), above fn.38, 89–90,
Table B.2.4.
188OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country
Reporting, Action 13—2015 Final Report (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015).
189Action 5, above fn.2, para.89.
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With respect to transfer pricing rules, prior to the BEPS Project the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines, recognised that it might be difficult to apply the arm’s length principle in practice.190
Since the BEPS Project, commentators have opined that the BEPS guidance has made the transfer
pricing process more complex.191 For instance, the “control” over risk requirement has received
a great deal of criticism. First, it is argued that this particular requirement can be met easily by
having the right people doing the right job. This could lead to the shifting of taxable bases from
high tax states to low tax states. Thus, the arm’s length principle promotes tax competition.192
Secondly, the guidelines state that in situations where multiple associated enterprises control the
risks, the risk should be allocated to the associated enterprise that demonstrates “most control”.193
The demonstration of this requirement could indeed be challenging from a practical perspective,
especially, in MNEs where management boards are similar/spread across various entities and
where consensus based decision-making takes place.194 Thirdly, a few commentators have argued
that the control test goes beyond the boundaries of the arm’s length standard. It is stated that
several situations exist among independent enterprises where the incidence of risk is separate
from the control over risk requirement. In other words, enterprises bear risks that they do not
control. Accordingly, courts may deviate from the control requirement if this is proven.195 Fourthly,
it is argued that the level of factual detail that is required to understand which party controls the
risks is substantially high. Accordingly, it could be burdensome for the taxpayers and the tax
administrations to undertake this analysis.196 Fifthly, there is no clarity as regards whether the
concept of control over risk for the purpose of Article 9 of the OECDModel and the significant
people functions with respect to risk assumption under Article 7 of the OECDModel are similar
or different. The OECD does not provide an answer to this issue. Accordingly, the approach
adopted in an Article 9 and an Article 7 analysis could be different.197
With respect to the PPT, the authors have argued that the subjective element should not be
satisfied if the transaction/arrangement/structure is rational from a commercial and/or an economic
perspective. However, if a judge interprets the phrase “one of the principal purposes” in a literal
manner then the subjective element may be satisfied as long as a tax benefit exists.198 This would
also be the case if a judge takes into consideration the LOB clause (and its related Commentary)
to interpret the “substance” requirements for the PPT. Therefore, the level of tax certainty with
respect to the test seems to be low (in other words, high tax uncertainty). In fact, the OECD has
identified this issue and in a recent report on tax certainty states:
“To increase tax certainty in the application of the PPT, the OECD has formed an informal
group of interested delegates that would explore various areas where more tax certainty
190OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, paras 1.9–1.13.
191See Collier and Andrus, above fn.36, 246.
192See Collier and Andrus, above fn.36, 230.
193OECD, TP Guidelines 2017, above fn.18, para.1.98.
194See Collier and Andrus, above fn.36, 230–231.
195See Collier and Andrus, above fn.36, 231–232.
196See Collier and Andrus, above fn.36, 246–247.
197 See L. Spinosa and V. Chand, “A Long-Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized Business Models: Should the
Permanent Establishment Definition Be Modified to Resolve the Issue or Should the Focus Be on a Shared Taxing
Rights Mechanism?” (2018) 46(6/7) Intertax 476.
198R. Kok, “The Principal Purpose Test in Tax Treaties under BEPS 6” (2016) 44(5) Intertax 406, 408–409.
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could be provided in the PPT, including best practices in the area of the general
anti-avoidance rules and would report back with recommendations.”199
The Commentary to the PPT currently analyses the impact of the PPT on 13 fact patterns.200
Moreover, the six additional fact patterns, which are discussed in the context of conduit
arrangements, are also analysed in light of the PPT.201 Out of these 19 examples, only five deal
with situations where the PPT is applied to deny the treaty benefit. Therefore, the OECD would
be advised to expand the Commentary by enhancing the negative list of examples. Reference
could be made to the fact patterns of the following court judgments wherein the denial of a treaty
benefit was heavily debated vis-à-vis holding entities: in Austria: N AG v Regional Tax Office
for Upper Austria202; in Canada:MIL (Investments) SA v Canada203 and thePrévost cases,Prévost
Car Inc v The Queen204; in India: Azadi Bacho Andolan v Union of India and another205; in Israel:
Yanko-Weiss Holdings Ltd v Holon Assessing Office206; and in Switzerland: A Holding ApS v
Federal Tax Administration.207 Furthermore, to enhance certainty, it could also be clarified that
taxpayers which avail themselves of substance based preferential regimes should be entitled to
treaty benefits for the underlying income. For instance, taxpayers that avail themselves of a
nexus compliant IP box regime should be entitled to the treaty benefits on royalty related income.208
In relation to EU law, the authors have argued that if the taxpayer is able to demonstrate that
its transaction/arrangement/structure is rational from a commercial and/or an economic perspective
then the subjective and non-genuine elements of the PSD and ATAD GAAR-type provisions
should not be satisfied. However, in line with the aforementioned discussion with respect to the
PPT, the analysis is subjective. Essentially, the question arises as to how will the CJEU interpret
the GAAR provisions?Will the Court interpret the phrases “the main purpose or one of the main
purposes” and “for valid commercial reasons which reflect economic reality” in light of its
established case law or will the Court depart from established case law and broaden the scope
of abuse? Also, a similar question arises in relation to how the CJEU will interpret the phrase
“substantive economic activity” in the context of the ATADCFC rules. It seems that this threshold
exceeds the wholly artificial arrangement threshold created by the CJEU.209 Therefore, from a
tax certainty perspective, it would be advisable if the EU Commission were to provide some
clarification as regards the interpretation of these provisions.
Finally, the notion of substantial activity in relation to IP box regimes seems to be uniform
among states. States forming part of the Inclusive Framework have adopted the nexus approach.
199See IMF/OECD, Update on Tax Certainty: IMF/OECD Report for the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors (July 2018), 12.
200OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.182.
201OECD MC 2017, above fn.5, Commentary on Article 29, para.187.
202N AG v Regional Tax Office for Upper Austria [2000] 2 ITLR 884.
203MIL (Investments) SA v Canada, above fn.62, [2006] 9 ITLR 25.
204Prévost Car Inc v The Queen [2008] 10 ITLR 736 at 736–758.
205Azadi Bacho Andolan v Union of India and another [2002] 4 ITLR 878.
206Yanko-Weiss Holdings Ltd v Holon Assessing Office [2007] 10 ITLR 524.
207A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration [2005] 8 ITLR 536.
208Danon, above fn.68, 33.
209 J. Schönfeld Bonn, “CFC Rules and the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive” (2017) 26(3) EC Tax Review 145, 150; G.
Ginevra, “The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan:
Necessity and Adequacy of the Measures at EU level” (2017) 45(2) Intertax 120, 129–130.
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However, the notion of substantial activity in relation to non-IP box regimes seems to have been
implemented differently. For example, compare the activity requirements in the financing
incentives offered by Mauritius and Singapore. Non-uniform implementation of such incentives
will lead to tax competition as discussed below.
3.2. The increase in tax competition for attracting economic activities
Although the BEPS Project has achieved a high degree of international tax
co-ordination/co-operation by ensuring that states adopt a common set of tax related rules, it has
at the same time enhanced international tax competition.210 Essentially, states compete by reducing
fiscal burdens to attract investment/activities into their jurisdiction or discourage the outflow of
investment/activities from their jurisdiction.211 As argued in this article, a taxpayer should be
given access to the entire international corporate tax framework as long as it satisfies the economic
activity test (also commercial rationale requirement). Consequently, the authors expect that states
will compete to attract economic activities, that is, people functions.212 Such competition will
either take the form of a reduction in corporate tax rates (as well as withholding taxes) or an
increase in tax incentives, among others, preferential regimes that attract mobile tax bases.213 In
fact, the recent OECD report, Tax Policy Reforms 2018: OECD and Selected Partner Economies
(the OECD Report) confirms this point of view.214
With respect to a reduction in corporate taxes, the OECD Report confirms that corporate tax
rate cuts have accelerated.215 Several states such as Argentina, Belgium, France, Japan,
Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the US have reduced their corporate tax rates in 2018.216
Moreover, several states such as the UK, Australia and Greece have announced corporate tax
rate cuts for future years.217Although not mentioned in the OECDReport, Switzerland has adopted
a corporate tax reform, expected to enter into force on 1 January 2020, alongside which some
cantons will be dropping their corporate tax rates. The effective corporate tax rates in Switzerland,
depending on the cantons, will range roughly from 13 per cent to 18 per cent.218 The OECD
Report highlights that
210P. Piantavigna, “Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in Aggressive Tax Planning: A False Dichotomy” (2017)
9(4) World Tax Journal 477, 477–496.
211For a detailed discussion on the merits and demerits of tax competition, see W. Schön, “Tax competition in Europe
– the legal perspective” (2000) 9(2) EC Tax Review 89, 91–95.
212EY, The outlook for global tax policy in 2018 (2018), 2–5;M.P. Devereux and J. Vella, “Implications of Digitalization
for International Corporate Tax Reform” (2018) 46(6/7) Intertax 550, 551–552.
213 M.J. Graetz, Follow the money: essays on international taxation (Yale: Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2016),
276–277; M. Keen, “Competition, Coordination and Avoidance in International Taxation” (2018) 72(4/5) Bulletin
for International Taxation 220, 224.
214See OECD, Tax Policy Reforms 2018: OECD and Selected Partner Economies (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018),
available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264304468-en [Accessed 18 June 2019].
215See the OECD Report, above fn.214, 65 and A.P. Dourado, “Taxes and Competitiveness: How Much Competitive
Is European Tax Competition?” (2018) 46(12) Intertax 942.
216See the OECD Report, above fn.214, 66–67.
217See the OECD Report, above fn.214, 67.
218Swiss Federal Council,Message concernant la loi fédérale sur le Projet fiscal 17, 21 March 2018, Federal Gazette
2018 2565, 2679.
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“countries appear to be engaged in a ‘race to the average’ rather than in a ‘race to the
bottom’, with their recent corporate tax rate cuts now placing them in the middle of the
pack”.219
With respect to a reduction of withholding taxes, the most notable reform pertains to the
Netherlands, which has increased the scope of its dividend withholding tax exemption to third
state treaty residents.220
The OECD Report also confirms that states have also increased tax incentives in order to
support investment. The tax incentives pertain to research and development incentives (input
incentives in the form of expensing R&D expenses and output incentives in the form of patent
boxes221), special economic zones schemes, accelerated depreciation provisions, capital investment
expensing provisions, small and medium enterprises tax base related changes and so on.222
Moreover, in light of the various BEPSActions, several states have issued guidelines with respect
to minimum substance requirements for accessing preferential tax regimes, such as the practice
adopted by Singapore, Mauritius and more recently the British Crown Dependencies as well as
the UAE (section 2.4).
4. The next stage: from Base Erosion and Profit Shifting to Base Expansion and Profit
Sharing
This article has argued that the taxpayer entity should be given access to the benefits offered by
the international corporate tax framework if that taxpayer satisfies the relevant economic activity
test. Accordingly, in the post-BEPS environment, MNEs can still engage in profit shifting
activities by having the appropriate people functions in low tax jurisdictions. On the other hand,
tax competition between states is intensifying in order to attract people functions. Interestingly,
the activity-based concepts discussed in section 2 do not alter the allocation of taxing rights
framework agreed between states. However, in light of the digitalisation of the economy,223 there
is pressure to reconsider the allocation of taxing rights framework (Pillar I) and find solutions
to counter genuine profit shifting strategies to low tax jurisdictions/tax competition between
states (Pillar II). Thus, we have already started to witness the movement from BEPS 1.0 to BEPS
2.0 (Base Expansion and Profit Sharing). The “core” challenges raised by digitalisation will be
discussed in another article.
219See the OECD Report, above fn.214, 9–10.
220See the OECD Report, above fn.214, 74.
221EY, above fn.212, 3–4.
222See the OECD Report, above fn.214, 7, 4–77.
223See OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of
the Economy, Public Consultation Document, 13 February–6 March 2019 (2019), available at: https://www.oecd.org
/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-addressing-the-tax-challenges-of-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.pdf
[Accessed 18 June 2019].
Abuse of rights; Base erosion and profit shifting; EU law; General anti-abuse rule; International tax planning;
Multinational companies; Tax policy
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